• This is a working paper. 
Introduction
In this paper we explore the idea that analyzing changes in the risk structure of stock returns may sometimes be more fruitful than trying to identify specific economic underpinnings of risk. As an example we exploit the natural experiment created by the dotcom bubble in the late 1990s and ask whether this was characterised by changes in the risk structure of UK stock returns. We carry out principal components analyses (PCA) of monthly returns for three subperiods between 01/1986 and 12/2000 and examine the loadings of the first and second principal components on innovations in explanatory economic variables in time series regressions. The loading pattern for the first component in the 'bubble/crash' period is both distinct from the preceding periods and plausibly characteristic of a market showing departure from fundamental pricing. While the second component shows no strong loading pattern on the explanatory variables in either the first or third sub-periods, in the 'pre-bubble' period it is characterized by significant loadings on a Consumer Confidence variable, leading us to conjecture that the changes in risk structure provided signals for the evolution of stock prices.
The relationship between risk and return in equity markets and the status of asset pricing models remains unresolved after four decades of debate. Multifactor approaches (unlike the CAPM) have the apparent advantage of being based on observable sources of risk but there is as yet no satisfactory theory to say what these risks are, so they have to be identified empirically. For example, in their three-factor model, Fama and French (FF) (1993) use size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) risk factors to explain the cross-section of average returns, but can only conjecture that loadings on these factors reflect firm profitability. Others (Mei, 1993; Brennan et al., 1998) have focused on size and book-to-market ratios as 'non-risk' firm-level characteristics. Brennan et al. suggest that these attract premia incremental 1 to both the FF factors and five components of a PCA model. The appellation 'non-risk' distinguishes firm characteristics from risk factors but the former are still subject to economic shocks and may not be wholly diversifiable. In one sense, therefore, a shift of focus towards firm characteristics simply moves the old question to a new domain -rather than identify the underlying sources of variation in stock returns we must now identify them for production, earnings and profitability.
Since they reflect the business cycle and the international competitive environment, macroeconomic variables with potential impact on the discounted dividend valuation model of stock prices seem to be attractive candidates as sources of risk. Two favoured methods for identifying risk factors in arbitrage pricing models have been either to carry out factor analyses of stock returns and relate the resulting factors to a selection of variables or to regress stock returns directly against pre-selected variables (Chan, et al., 1985; Chen et al., 1986; Chen and Jordan, 1993 ; for the US - Beenstock and Chan, 1988; Poon and Taylor, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996; Antoniou et al., 1998 ; for the UK). There are problems of interpretation here since a common premise, implicit or explicit, is that the economic variables represent specific sources of risk. This may not be reasonable, since it is hard to specify a priori the news impact of a shock of given size, to know what the risk implications might be or even to know whether the shock constitutes good or bad news for investors, because these things depend on the wider social, political and economic context. Indeed, Cheng (1996) The stock market bubble of the late 1990s forms a natural experiment in which to examine changes in the risk structure of stock returns. In particular we are drawn to the idea that a price bubble is unlikely to arise unless there is a pre-existing 'psychological climate' that allows it. Almost by definition, market participants are likely to over-estimate the significance of positive price signals in an optimistic climate and under-estimate their significance in a pessimistic climate (creating, inter alia, the psychological underpinnings for momentum in asset prices). But this begs the question of what it is that creates the market sentiment in the first place. Since a market bubble is highly unlikely to be a sudden random event without observable pre-cursors it is the evolution of the relevant market sentiment that is of particular interest. Indeed, compared to the progress of the bubble itself, the evolution of conditions favorable to a bubble may be relatively slow. It also seems to us that looking for bubble precursors in the time-path of stock prices is problematic, since the bubble and prior stock prices are clearly not independent and there is a strong danger of creating a circular explanation. A variable is needed that is both measured independently of stock prices and likely to capture the evolution of market sentiment. Since markets and investors are part of the wider economy, we argue that consumer confidence indicators make suitable candidates.
Our approach differs from other UK studies (Beenstock and Chan, 1988; Poon and Taylor, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996) , all of which sought to identify macroeconomic variables attracting risk-premia in crosssectional pricing equations. We use a time-series approach similar to that of Chen and Jordan (1993) to examine the macroeconomic underpinnings of risk factors but we differ by (i) using UK data and (ii) using PCA to extract components from individual stock returns instead of factor analysis on portfolios of stocks. More important, we differ from all the studies cited above by focusing on changes in the pattern of explanatory variables over time rather than seeking to identify the 'true' economic underpinnings of risk. Finally we differ from all other studies of which we are aware by the novel inclusion of a Consumer
Confidence explanatory variable.
In the next section we briefly review standard PCA as a method of extracting risk factors and in section 3 we describe the data and the design of the analysis. We present PCA results in section 4 followed by a discussion in section 5 of the results of regressing component scores against the selected economic variables.
Risk Factors in Stock Markets and Principal Components Analysis
Arbitrage pricing models have been examined using factor-analytic techniques by a number of authors for the US (Roll and Ross, 1980; Chen, 1983; Dhrymes et al., 1985a Dhrymes et al., , 1985b Shukla and Trzcinka, 1990 ) and the UK (Beenstock and Chan, 1986; Abeysekera and Mahajan, 1987; Cheng, 1996) .
Although much of the literature has been focused on factor analysis, work by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) suggests that PCA may be the methodology of choice when stock returns are assumed to follow an approximate factor structure. In the APM (Ross, 1977) it is assumed that the return to asset i, , is generated by a multi-factor process with a strict factor structure:
Here is the mean return to asset i while the are independently distributed mean-zero, unit-variance factors with loadings . The variables are uncorrelated with the residual disturbances, , which are themselves uncorrelated with each other. The covariance matrix of returns to the N assets, , can therefore be partitioned into 
If a sufficiently well-diversified portfolio can be formed that the residual risk of (1) vanishes then (3) will hold as an equality. Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) argue that the assumption of a strict factor structure with few factors is too strong, and show that an approximate factor structure will also lead to the APM relationship given in (3). Using an approximate factor structure the partition given by (2) is re-written as
where for any number of assets, the residual matrix is a positive semi- In what follows, the matrix S can be either the covariance or the correlation matrix of the x variables but it must be noted that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the components extracted in the two cases. In this study we use the correlation matrix because using the covariance matrix may (i) cause individual stocks with larger than average variances to dominate the first few principal components (Joliffe, 1986) and (ii) emphasise sample-specific noise in identifying common sources of risk.
The first component,
, is chosen to maximise subject to the normalisation constraint ( If the covariation in stock returns can be summarised by a small number, K, of components, there will be K distinct eigenvalues (and principal components) that explain the majority of the variation in S. Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) show (i) that if S has K unbounded eigenvalues there is an approximate factor structure that is unique and (ii) that estimates of the K eigenvectors will converge.
The number of significant components, K, is likely to be substantially smaller than the number of variables (US cross-sectional studies suggest that about three or four risk factors are priced) but identifying this number is likely to be complicated by sample-specific random variation, particularly when the PCA is carried out on small samples. While tests are available for the number of significant components (Connor and Korajczyk, 1993) this is not of concern here. We argue instead that if the multi-factor structure of common systematic risk has any strong underlying economic meaning then we should be able to detect this in the relationship between economic variables and scores on the first two or three components, even when using fairly small stock samples.
Data and Methodology
In this study, PCA is carried out on groups of UK stocks selected in alphabetical order. Patterns in the structure of risk are revealed by regressing component scores in time-series against economic variables. Since stock markets are presumed to respond to economic news, white noise 'innovations' in the variables are derived by using the Kalman Filter from STAMP (Koopman et al. 2000) . The relationship between the innovations and component scores is established by using the general-to-specific methodology (Hendry, 1995; Hendry and Krolzig, 2001 ) of PcGets (OxMetrics TM ).
While we have argued that changes in socio-economic conditions are likely to cause the underlying risk structure of stock markets to change, it is implicit in standard PCA that the true component structure is invariant over the sample period for which the components are extracted. It is also assumed that sufficient stocks are sampled to allow valid inferences to be drawn (Stevens (1996) recommends that standard PCA should use at least twice the number of IT stocks in the sample creates any systematic effect. Descriptive statistics for the samples are given in Table 1 . It is evident that average returns are lower for the 'bubble' period (as a result of the eventual crash) with betas fairly close to unity in most cases (with a narrow spread). There is some heterogeneity in market capitalisation across groups and sub-periods but this does not produce any systematic effects in the results.
The PCA was repeated for each group of stocks and each period, producing a large number of principal components, eigenvalues and loadings.
Adapting from expression (5) 
The Economic Variables
Here we follow both traditional practice and published empirical findings (Chen et al., 1986; Chen and Jordan, 1993; Poon and Taylor, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996) to select macroeconomic variables thought to influence either expected dividends ( )
or the discount rate R of the stock valuation model:
The selected variables are shown in Table 2 . We include the UK FTA All Share index and its Dividend Yield since the market index return is a generally powerful explanatory variable in time-series factor models and its exclusion could lead to omitted variables bias (we are also interested in the incremental impact on component scores from other sources of economic news). In addition to variables commonly selected in other studies, and following the motivation outlined in the introduction, we include a Consumer Confidence indicator. Chen et al. (1986) note that explanations of systematic risk should include any variables "necessary to complete the description of the state of nature" and that an example "would be one that has no direct influence on current cash flows but that does describe the changing investment opportunity set" (p384). Consumer confidence indicators that are intended to measure expectations seem to be a case in point, with various studies finding evidence of a relationship between these indicators and stock returns (Otoo, 1999; Fisher and Statman, 2002; Jansen and Nahuis, 2003) . They also have the advantage of being constructed entirely independently of the macroeconomic series and of stock prices. Thus, the UK consumer confidence indicator is a composite of survey responses concerning expectations of the general economic situation and household financial position, perceptions of how these have changed over the last twelve months and views on major household purchases. If the risk structure of stock returns is sensitive to changes in the wider socio-economic context it seems to us highly plausible that this should be indicated by effects arising through indicators of this sort.
While our other variables are expected to have an impact on the valuation of cash flows they are also intended to capture the business cycle and required risk premia (Industrial production, unemployment, retail prices, money supply, retail sales, term spread and default risk) as well as portfolio balance (market capital gain and dividend yield, commodity prices, oil and gold prices, exchange rate). Data for all explanatory variables are drawn from Datastream.
Since only unexpected changes in the variables are of importance ('news'), innovations were derived in every case by applying the Kalman Filter to the raw series -a technique that seen increasing use in recent years (Priestley, 1996; Cauchie et al., 2004) . Using STAMP, white noise residuals (the innovations) were generated by either an unobserved components model or (if this produced autocorrelated residuals) an autoregressive model with timevarying parameters. A detailed presentation of the Kalman filter is to be found in Harvey (1989) , with brief details in Priestley (1996) . The time series of the raw variables and the Kalman filter residuals are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. 
PCA Results
The full matrix of PCA results is quite large, so only the main results are given. Table 3 shows the incremental percent of total variation explained by the first three principal components. Table 4 shows the numbers of principal components with eigenvalues greater than unity and the percentage of total variation they explain. From Tables 3 and 4 it is evident that the first component captures as much of the total variation as the second and third components combined and sometimes very much more (four times as much in the extreme case).
However, the percent explained by the second and third components is not negligible (averaging 7 or 8% in each case).
The individual stock loadings on a principal component convey very little information and there is a very strong chance that they will capture samplespecific variation -(i.e. individual stock loadings have little economic significance). We therefore investigate the economic underpinnings of the overall component scores to see if any systematic explanatory patterns can be observed, with replication over different stock samples.
Regression of Economic Variables on Component Scores
The 10 Fama and French (1993) note that a much wider spread of betas is observed when the excess market return is used alone in time series regressions than when used in conjunction with their SMB and HML factors (when the market betas all move closer to unity). This suggests that the market return used alone is also likely to capture sources of risk otherwise represented by the SMB and HML factors. If the latter are driven by variation in earnings and profitability, as FF conjecture, we might expect to find additional explanatory contributions to the first principal component from the remaining variables (insofar as these affect cash flows).
Second, since we conjecture that the structure of risk varies with changes in the wider socio-economic context, we expect distinct patterns of significant variables in the various principal components for the bubble and pre-bubble periods, involving Consumer Confidence in particular.
Consumer PcGets might seem questionable in some circumstances but, because they remove any possibility of subjectivity in the final selection of variables, they seem to us to be highly desirable for any research design involving replication.
In our view, this substantially increases the robustness of the results.
The final models derived from the general-to-specific modeling procedure are shown in Table 5 . This has been made more readable by identifying significant coefficients by letter and removing all non-significant coefficients F-tests confirm the joint significance of the coefficients in every case for which either the initial GUM of equation (8) Of the remaining variables none occur with sufficient regularity across the 30 replications for any conclusions to be drawn. The general non-significance of the macroeconomic variables is somewhat surprising, considering the significant risk premia that have been found elsewhere in UK cross-sectional studies. While this may arise from using small stock samples to generate the principal components, it seems to us that an economic variable that cannot easily be detected as a source of risk is probably not very important. Much more important, in our view, is that our procedures seem to have identified interesting changes in the pattern of risk during the 'natural experiment' of the dotcom bubble and crash. Of these results, the most interesting is the strong emergence of Consumer Confidence as an explanatory variable. While we expected this variable to reflect investor sentiment in a changing economic environment, we did not really expect the impact to be quite so sharply demarcated (pre-bubble period and second component only). Given that the principal components are orthogonal, and that the first component is, as expected, dominated by the actual market return, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that an evolution of market sentiment would be detected by the second component -that is, during the pre-bubble period the gradual evolution of market sentiment and the behavior of the market index itself were measured independently. During the bubble period, however, we speculate that consumer confidence was directly translated into stock market sentiment, making it impossible to disentangle consumer confidence, market sentiment and the behavior of the market index, leading to the predominant importance of Market Capital Gain as the only clear explanatory variable and to the apparent departure from fundamental pricing.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the time pattern of risk in the UK stock explanatory in the pre-bubble period, leading us to speculate that this period saw the evolution of a sentiment that pre-disposed markets to bubble. All these results were strongly robust with respect to replication across non-overlapping samples.
We have argued that the investigation of changes in risk structure is likely to be more fruitful than any search for the 'true' underpinnings of risk, speculating that these changes contain information signaling the future pattern of stock prices.
Such speculation is admittedly strong and ultimately demands a suitable model of behavioral finance in which investor sentiment can both accumulate over time and aggregate into a dynamic macroeconomic influence on stock prices.
